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Abstract– Active attacking in physical-layer security has not been significantly studied while potentially causing serious
consequences for the legitimate networks. In this paper, we propose a novel method to estimate and remove the jamming
signals from multiple multi-antenna jammers in a two-way relay network with multi-antenna legitimate and relay nodes.
We carefully consider the signals in the time slots in order to exploit the repetition of the signals and design the transmitted
signals which can work in different cases. The numerical results show that the secrecy rate at the legitimate nodes of the
proposed scheme is higher than that of the conventional method when considering the affect of transmit signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR); the number antennas at the legitimate and relay nodes; normalized distance between one legitimate node and
the relay; and the vertical coordinate of the relay.
Keywords– Eavesdropper, jamming, physical-layer security, reactive, untrusted relay.
1 Introduction
Physical-layer security has been extensively researched
for about two decades. A great number of results and
techniques have been created. The view on the mali-
cious agents have also changed, become more diverse,
and upgraded over time [1–3]. Generally, the mali-
cious agents can be classified into two main categories:
passive and active attacks. The former refers to those
nodes only listening to or overhearing signals, trying
to extract the most information from them, and using
it for malicious purposes including analysis while the
later can emit attacking signals.
Eavesdroppers and untrusted relays/cooperators can
be considered as passive attackers [1]. The eavesdrop-
pers stay completely in the “dark” and are generally
assumed to be unknown by the legitimate nodes in
terms of positions and channel gains. In the majority of
cases, the distribution of those variables are assumed
to be known by the legitimate nodes. The untrusted
cooperative nodes will honestly help/cooperate with
the legitimate nodes in a way that the secrecy rate
is maximized. However, in the meantime, they try
to extract as much information as possible from the
received/overheard signals and use it for malicious
purposes. Other trustworthy levels/trust degrees can
also be defined to consider a finer resolution of mali-
ciousness [4].
Even though the active attacking topics has not been
extensively researched, there are a number of works
in this area. Yan et al. proposed a scheme to remove
the jamming signals by variable elimination in equation
solving for a point-to-point wireless network however
the full description is given for the case of only two
antennas and one jammer [5]. Karlsson et al. designed
an optimal scheme to jam a pair of single-antenna
transmitter and receiver with a direct transmission [6].
In a game-theoretic and multi-antenna scenario in [7],
the eavesdropper can choose either eavesdropping and
jamming the legitimate nodes in a direct transmission.
A few other works considered on jamming attacking
in VANETS [8], flying Ad Hoc networks [9], jamming
attacking in cognitive radio networks with Stackelberg
Game [10].
In an efficient way of using energy, while passive
attackers try to maximally receive information, active
attackers try to maximally hinder the transmissions
of the legitimate [11, 12]. Two examples of actively
attacking is jamming and forwarding garbled informa-
tion [13]. Basically, there are three modes of jamming
as follows.
• Constant jamming: the jammers always transmit
jamming signals [14].
• Random jamming: the jammers only transmit in
random time slots with a certain probability [15].
• Reactive jamming: only when the jammers detect
an active transmission from the legitimate nodes,
they transmit. However, we assume that due to
the delay of the detection, the jammers only start
the jamming transmission one time slot after the
legitimate nodes start their transmission [16].
In each jamming mode, the jammers can transmit one
of two signal types as follows.
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• Fixed signal: each jammer always transmit the
same signal.
• Varied signal: each jammer transmit a different
signal in every time slot.
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme to estimate
and remove the jamming signals in a two-way relay
network with multi-antenna legitimate, relaying, and
jamming nodes. The two-way relay network is con-
sidered because this network model is very popular
in practice, e.g., a wireless user is downloading from
and uploading to a server [17]. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work on such a topic. We
consider constant and reactive fixed-signal jamming.
The numerical results show that the performance of the
proposed scheme in both modes is better than that of
the conventional scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the system model used in the pa-
per. Section 3 presents the proposed and conventional
schemes in the constant jamming mode. From the result
of this section, we discuss and deduce the result for
the reactive jamming mode, and present in Section 4.
The numerical results are presented and analyzed in
Section 5 and the conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
2 System Model
2.1 General System Model
In this part, we describe the general model for both
conventional and proposed schemes. A and B, which
are referred here to as legitimate nodes, want to send
information signal vectors xA and xB, respectively, to
each other as shown in Figure 1. However, due to a
large distance or a bad faded channel between them,
there is not a reliable channel for them to exchange the
information and they must rely on the help of relay R.
There are K actively attacking nodes which transmit
jamming signals to make interference to the transmis-
sions of A, B, and R. We assume that A, B, and R do
not have information about all jamming signals and all
channels from the jammers to them but know which
jamming mode and signal type are used. Nodes A, B,
R, and Jk are equipped with n, n, nR, and nJ antennas,
respectively. To focus on estimating and cancelling the
jamming signals, we assume that the channels between
A (B) and R are known among these nodes so that the
needed information signals are successfully detected.
The channels are fixed in a coherence time of l time
slots and change between such periods. Therefore all
precoding vectors and matrices can be calculated at A,
B, and R.
2.2 System Model for the Proposed Scheme
In this part, we describe the system model and
common scheme for the proposed scheme in both con-
stant and reactive jamming modes. In order to analyze
the characteristics of different scenarios and classify
them, we first describe the general transmission scheme







Figure 1. The network model. Transmissions in the first and second
frames are represented by solid and dashed arrows, respectively.
two phases. There are m1 and m2 time slots in the first
and second phases, respectively. The designed scheme
will depend on the comparison between these numbers
and l. The channel matrices from A and B to R in slot i





The channel matrices from the k-th jammer to A, B,





and GiP,iR,k, respectively. The noise in time slot i of phase
iP ∈ {1, 2} at node iN ∈ {R, B} is denoted by ziP,iiN . We
denote 1× n vectors with all entries of 1 and 0 by 1n
and 0n, respectively; element i and elements i1 to i2




(i, j), column j, and row i of matrix A by [A]i,j, [A](:,j)
and [A](i,:), respectively; and the determinant of matrix
A by |A| = det(A). Assume we can write A = {[A]i,j}.
In slot i of phase 1, A and B transmit the i-th elements



















where 1 ≤ i ≤ m1; uA and uA are corresponding






B is referred to
as the mixed information signal. In slot j of phase 2, R
precodes y1,iR with matrix B
ji
B ∈ CnR×nR and transmit it






































































where 1 ≤ j ≤ m2. Since xiB, channels, precoding vectors
and matrices are available at B, it can remove the second
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refer g1,iR and g
2,j
B to as jamming components of the first





x2,jJ,k as jamming factors. Generally, there are methods to
decode needed information signal xiA as follows.
• B decodes xiA treating all jamming components
as noise. This method gives a low performance,
especially when the jamming powers are high or
the channels from the jammers to B are good.
• B estimates all jamming components first, cancels
them in ỹ2,jB , and decodes x
i
A. This is impossible
since B does not achieve enough signals to de-
code the needed signals. To demonstrate this, we
consider two cases as follows in the most general
scenario in which all channels and jamming signals
change every time slot.
– Estimating each jamming component in factors:







in two phases; all
m1KnJnR channels from the jammers to R in
phase 1; all m2KnJn channels from the jammers
to B in phase 2. However, B achieves only m2n
signals in vector ỹ2,jB while m2n is much smaller
than (m1 + m2)KnJ + m1KnJnR + m2KnJn.
– Estimating each jamming component as a whole:
we reduce the number of variables to be esti-







and does not need to es-











In this case, B has m1nR + m2n + m1 signals
to decode, including m1nR signals in all g
1,i
R ,
m2n signals in all g
2,i
B , and m1 signals in xA.
However, again m2n is also much smaller than
m1nR + m2n + m1.
• We design the transmission scheme and the pre-
coding matrices so as in phase 1, R can estimate
each jamming component as a whole or in factors,
cancel them, amplify and forward a jamming-free
version of the mixed information signal to A and
B in phase 2; and in phase 2, A and B can estimate
each jamming component as a whole or in factors,
cancel them, and decode the information signal. In
this paper, we use this third method and explain
about it in more details below.
The way we design the scheme depends on which
jamming mode and jamming signal type are used as
well as how long the coherence time is. In fact, jam-
ming components g1,iR and g
2,j














channels are decided by the surrounding environment
while the jamming signals are decided by the jammers.
Jamming signals may vary slower than the channels
with a short-enough coherence time and, e.g., constant
jamming strategy with fixed signals. On the other hand,
jamming signals may vary faster than the channels
with a long-enough coherence time and, e.g., reactive
jamming strategy with varied signals. The varying rate
of the jamming components is the rate of the one, of the
two factors, channels and signals, which varies faster.
In addition, the faster the factors vary, the more difficult
it is for us to estimate the jamming components. In this
paper, we consider all three jamming modes with both
signal types and coherence time l ≥ 2 since with l = 1,
the jamming components vary the fastest and there is
not enough information to estimate them. Furthermore,
l ≥ 2 is reasonable and usually assumed for wireless
cooperative/relaying networks.
The jamming signal from each jammer is always the






0nJ , when not jamming.
(4)
In case all jammers transmit with the same signal,
aJ,k = aJ, ∀k. However, as we will try to decode and
cancel jamming component g1,iR and g
2,i
B as a whole, not
the individual jamming signals from jammers, that the
jamming signals from different jammers are the same
or not is not important. However, we assume that in a
time slot all jammers transmit jamming signals or all
jammers do not transmit jamming signals. The case in
which some jammers transmit while others do not in a
time slot is not considered in this section. To improve
the average rate, we design that the coherence time fits
into each phase, i.e., each of the two phases consists of
l time slots. In this section, we consider only two cases:
all jammers transmit in a time slot with probability pJ;
and no jammer transmits, with probability 1− pJ.
3 Constant Jamming
3.1 Conventional Scheme
In this scheme, we assume that all jamming signals
cannot be estimated and removed, therefore R, A, and
B will treat them as noise. In return, they use all time
slots for transmitting information signals instead of
sacrificing one for estimating the jamming components.
The scheme is performed every two time slots and does
not depend on the coherence time. The noise vectors
at node R and B are respectively denoted by zR and
zB below. In the first slot, the received signal at R is
given by
yR = H1AuAxA + H
1
BuBxB + gR + zR. (5)
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The MAR at B is given by (10) at the beginning of the
next page where subscript “C” refer to the conventional
scheme. Similarly, the MAR at A is given by (11) at
the beginning of the next page. R estimates xiA and x
i
B
with MARs respectively given by (12) and (13) at the












The jammers always jam with the same signals there-
fore, we design such that in first time slot of each phase
of the first frame, the transmitter does not transmit
any signal. The intended receiver thus receives only
the jamming signals and noise. It needs to estimate the
jamming signals and use them to cancel their contri-
bution in the received signals in the next time slots.
Since the channels are fixed in each phase, we replace
superscripts i and j of H and u by 1 and 2, respectively.
In the first time slot of the first phase, A and B
transmit no signal so the signal received at R is given by
y1R = gR + z
1
R (15)
where gR , ∑Kk=1 G
1
R,kaJ,k. For simplicity, in this paper
we use Zero Forcing to estimate the jamming compo-
nent as ĝ1R = y
1
R.* In the i-th time slot of the first phase,
2 ≤ i ≤ l, A and B transmit their respective information









B + gR + z
i
R (16)
where 2 ≤ i ≤ l. In the first time slot of the second
phase, R does not transmit any signals so that B receives








In the j-th time slot of the second phase, R calculates
ỹiR = y
i













*If MMSE is used, ĝ1R = ΛRy
1
R where ΛR is a diagonal matrix in
which element (i, i) is given by ΛR[i, i] =
∑Kk=1
∣∣∣[G1R,k]i ∣∣∣2 [pJ,k ]i
∑Kk=1
∣∣∣[G1R,k]i ∣∣∣2 [pJ,k ]i+σ2 .
where 2 ≤ j ≤ l, to remove g1R and transmits x
j
R, which





































In section 2.2, we have used precoding matrix BjiB for
the transmitted signal from R. This can be used for a
general view of the readers. However, optimizing this
matrix can lead to very complicated content which may
require a lot of other works. Therefore, in this paper we
assume BjiB = InR which is a nR × nR eye matrix. The



























B also uses similar technique used by R in (18) to
remove the jamming component by calculating






















Since H1B, uB, and x
i
B are known at B, it removes the



















Since there two phases each with l time slots and
the first time slot in each phase is used to calibrate the
jamming component, the scheme can only transfer l− 1.
messages from A to B. The maximum achievable rate





















where subscripts “P” and “Co” refer to the proposed
scheme and constant jamming, respectively. Similarly,
A can remove the jamming component and known






















R estimates xiA and x
i
















































































































































In reactive jamming, the jammers only jam when detect-
ing that the legitimate nodes are transmitting. When
the legitimate nodes stop transmitting, they also stop
jamming. However, it takes a short period of time
for them to detect a transmission. So in this period,
the legitimate receivers can receive and decode their
needed information signals in a jamming-free way. In
this paper, we assume that this period is equal to one
time slot [5].
4.1 Conventional Scheme
In the first time slot of the conventional scheme, the
legitimate and relaying nodes enjoy a jamming-free slot.
However, from the second slot, they are continuously
jammed. Therefore, if we consider a very large time
scale, the affect of the first slot is insignificant. Note
that the time scale we mention here is not related to the
coherence time since the working of the conventional
scheme does not depend on the coherence time as long
as it is at least two time slots. As a result, we almost
can approximate the secrecy rate of the conventional
scheme in reactive jamming mode to that in constant
jamming mode.
4.2 Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme is designed as follows. In the
first slot of the first phase, A and B simultaneously
transmit x1A and x
1
B, respectively. R receives the mixed
information signal jamming-free. In the second slot,
A and B repeat their transmissions in the first slot.
Since this slot is jammed, R use the mixed information
signal estimated in the first slot to cancel its contri-
bution in the received signal in the second slot and
estimate the jamming component. In slot i, 3 ≤ i ≤ l,
A and B transmit information signals xi−1A and x
i−1
B ,
respectively. R easily removes the jamming component.
The second phase is conducted in a similar way and
finally l − 1 pairs of information signals are delivered
to the receivers. Obviously, the secrecy sum-rate of this
case is the same as in constant jamming. Consequently,
in section Numerical Results we do not distinguish
these two jamming modes for both conventional and
proposed schemes.
5 Numerical Results
In this section, we present several numerical results
to show the superiority of the proposed scheme to
the conventional scheme in many scenarios. In the
first scenario, we consider three antennas at all nodes
including three jammers. The powers at a non-jamming
node (A, B, and R) and a jamming node are 1 and
0.02†, respectively. All A-R, B-R, Jk-A, Jk-B, and Jk-R
channels are circular complex Gaussian with mean of 0
and variance of 1. Since in this paper, we focus on the
estimation and removal of the jamming signals rather
than on optimization of precoding vectors, we choose
these precoding vectors as corresponding vectors 1.
Figure 2 shows the maximum achievable sum-rate
of the proposed and conventional schemes as the SNR
is varied with different coherence times of l time slots.
Note that the performance of the conventional does not
depend on the coherence time as A-R and B-R channels
†We choose a low jamming power in order to show relative
comparison between the proposed and conventional schemes. As
the performance of the proposed scheme does not depend on the
jamming power since all jamming signals are estimated and removed.
The factors to deteriorate its performance is double noises as shown
in (24) and (25).
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P, l = 2
P, l = 6
P, l = 10
Figure 2. The proposed scheme (P) in different coherence times, (l
time slots). The performance of the conventional scheme (C) does
not depend on l.
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P, l = 2
P, l = 6
P, l = 10
Figure 3. The effect of the number of antennas at A and B on the
secrecy rate at SNR = 15 dB.
in both time slots of the scheme are perfectly known at
A, B, and R even though they are different between two
time slots. In the proposed scheme, A, B, and R sacrifice
one time slot in each coherence time to estimate the
jamming components which change every coherence
time. At higher SNR regime, the proposed scheme is
better and surpass the conventional scheme more and
more since the double noises get less effective. In the
meantime, it also improves with the coherence time
since with a long coherence time the sacrificed time
slot becomes insignificant.
Figure 3 shows the effect of the number of antennas
at A and B on the secrecy rate at SNR of 15 dB.
The performance of the conventional scheme increases
faster than that of the proposed scheme since the former
is affected by the interference (jamming signals) whose
effect can be reduced by a larger number of receiving
antennas while the latter is affected by the noise whose
effect can be increased. When the number of antennas at
R is increased as shown in Figure 4, the performance of
the proposed scheme also increases but not rapidly. The
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

































P, l = 2
P, l = 6
P, l = 10
Figure 4. The effect of the number of antennas at the relay on the
secrecy rate at SNR = 15 dB.
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P, l = 2
P, l = 6
P, l = 10
Figure 5. The affect of the relay’s horizontal coordinate, rX, on the
secrecy rate.
relay can reduce the affect of the jamming signals more
effectively, however, at the same time, it also increases
its decoding rate therefore the secrecy rate is finally
decreased since the leaked rate is larger.
To analyze the affect of the positions of the nodes
to the performance of the schemes, we consider the
scenario where the all channel gains are given by
d−
3
2 h in which d is the physical distance between the
considered transmitter and receiver, 3 is the power path
loss coefficient in the non-line of sight wireless module,
and h is the circular complex Gaussian random variable
with 0 mean and 1 variance (as described in Section
2). A, Jk, R, and B are respectively located at (0, 1),
(1,1), (rX, 1), and (2, 1) positions. The SNR is fixed at
15 dB. The affect of the relay’s horizontal coordinate
on the secrecy rate is shown in Figure 5. As with
other two-way relay scenarios, the performance of the
proposed scheme maximizes at the middle since all
jamming signals are removed. However, as they are not
removed in the conventional scheme, its performance
minimizes here.
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P, l = 2
P, l = 6
P, l = 10
Figure 6. The affect of the relay’s vertical coordinate, rY, on the secrecy
rate.
A, Jk, and B are kept at the same positions as in
Figure 5. However, the relay (1, rY) moves from (1,
0) to (1, 2), i.e., on the line perpendicular to the line
connection A and B positions. This means that the affect
of the position change is weaker therefore the the curve
near the maxima are more rounded than in the previous
case. We can find the maxima of the performance of the
conventional scheme near rY = 0.3 and rY = 1.7. These
two maximum values are symmetrical across the line of
rY = 1. At these maxima, there is a balance between the
negative affect of the jammers and the positive affect of
the optimal position of the relay which both culminate
at rY = 1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a two-way relay
network with multi-antenna legitimate, relaying, and
jamming nodes. We proposed a novel scheme to es-
timate and eliminate the jamming signals in case of
constant and reactive jamming modes. The numerical
results showed that the secrecy rate of the proposed
scheme is larger than that of the conventional scheme.
The superiority of the proposed scheme increases with
the coherence time. Generally, the performance of the
conventional scheme is affected by interference and
therefore significantly improved by a larger number
of antennas at A and B. Meanwhile, that of the pro-
posed scheme is affected by doubled and amplified
noise due to the process of eliminating jamming signals
and therefore slightly improved by a larger number of
antennas at A and B. The larger number of antennas at
the relay helps to reduce the effect of the jamming but
also increases the leaked rate. The optimal position of
the relay is achieved at the midpoint between A and B
as in other relay networks.
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